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 Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of culture and the interaction between cultural distance and 
salient acquirer characteristics on value creation of acquiring firms based on a sample of 209 
firms over the period of 1998-2012. The findings indicate that Chinese acquirer experience 
wealth gains ranging from 0.45% – 1.49% over a 10 day event window. We find cultural 
distance to exert a negative influence on value creation of acquirers in the short-and long-
term. However, the negative returns are significant only in the short-term but not in the long-
term.  Further evidence shows that acquirer large size, prior experience and high Tobin’s q 
positively moderate the link between cultural distance and value creation. The results suggest 
that the effect of culture distance is conditioned by the acquirer size, prior experience and 
Tobin’s q implying that acquirer resources and managerial capabilities are important in 




Studies investigating the antecedents of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (CBM&A) 
performance have documented the important role of national cultural distance in explaining 
CBM&A (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Reus and Lamont, 2009; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Dikova 
and Sahib, 2013; Ahern et al., 2015). However, despite numerous studies examining the 
relationship between cultural issues and CBM&A performance, the results of prior studies have 
been mixed and controversial. One strand of literature suggests that cultural difference 
represents a source of risk which impedes integration of the firms involved in the acquisition 
transactions and negatively affect the acquisition returns (David and Singh, 1994; Datta and 
Puia, 1995). On the other hand, the competing view indicates that the cultural distance-value 
creation relationship in CBM&A is more complex (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Reus and Lamont, 
2009). Emphasizing the complex nature of cultural distance, Ghoshal (1987) notes that the 
mere existence of cultural diversity between two countries or firms does not necessarily mean 
that it impedes value creation. Rather, cultural differences may create potential for learning and 
value creation (Reus and Lamont, 2009; Chakrabarti et al., 2009).  
Against the backdrop of mixed findings, Reus and Lamont (2009) called for further 
research to reconcile the conflicting literature streams. Responding to this call, Dikova and 
Sahib (2013) and Li et al. (2016) examined the moderating role of acquirer prior experience, 
financial advisor and industry effect in cultural distance-performance nexus. While these 
studies have made notable contributions to the field, it is important to point out that these 
studies are limited to one or two acquirer salient characteristics (i.e., prior experience and size) 
and ignored other equally important acquirer-specific factors such as managerial know-how 
and competence. Thus, we still have gaps in literature as to how and the extent to which the 
acquiring firm characteristics can be leveraged to moderate the effects of cultural distance on 
value creation in emerging market context.  
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Drawing on the resources-based view, this paper contends that the effects of cultural 
distance-value creation association cannot be understood in isolation from the resources and 
capabilities of the acquiring firm such as size, prior experience, managerial know-how and 
competence. This is because it is argued that strategy models based only on social environment 
makes unrealistic assumption about firm homogeneity (Das & Teng, 1991). However, firm 
resources are heterogeneous and performance differences across firms can be explained by the 
variance in firms’ resources and capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984; Das & Teng, 2000). Moreover, 
resource-based view posits that resources constitute the basis for the development and 
implementation of firm strategy (Barney, 1991). Therefore, resources which are internal to the 
firm interact with external environmental factors such as culture to produce firm returns and 
increase competitive advantage (Hitt et al., 2001). Indeed, studies have documented the 
relevance of firm resources and capabilities for succeeding in international markets (Slangen, 
2006; Fang et al., 2013). In the context of international acquisitions, Slangen (2006); Stahl and 
Voigt (2008); and Bauer et al. (2016) argue that acquirer characteristics determine its 
integrating capabilities which are essential for overcoming cultural impediments associated 
with CBM&A and consequently value creation. Yet, relatively little attention has been given 
to the joint effect of cultural distance and acquirer characteristics on value creation in emerging 
market context. This study attempts to fill this gap. 
The purpose of this paper is to extend prior literature by examining the effects of the 
interaction between cultural distance and salient acquirer characteristics, namely, acquirer size, 
prior experience of acquirer and acquirer Tobin’s q on value creation of acquiring firms from 
an emerging country. The choice of the above factors is motivated by the fact that these 
acquirer-specific factors represent important resources and managerial capabilities1 required 
1 Tobin’s q has also been used to explain diverse corporate phenomena including managerial performance 
organizational performance; and investment opportunities (Lang, Stulz & Walking, 1989; Wernerfelt and 
Montgomery, 1988; Servaes, 1991). 
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for CBM&A integration and hence may play a moderating role in creating firm value (see Lang 
et al., 1991; Servaes, 1991; Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz, 2004; Singh and Montgomery, 
1987 and King et al., 2004). These factors are especially important in emerging market context, 
where firms entering foreign markets do not only encounter institutional constraints but may 
lack prior international experience as latecomers and face intense competitions from 
established players in the international market for corporate control (Deng, 2009). For example, 
Hayward (2002) argues that prior acquisition experience affects the quality of inferences that 
are deployed in subsequent acquisitions and may therefore be important for value creation. 
Similarly, acquiring firm size is associated with the level of resources or scale of economies 
which may ameliorate the impact of cultural distance and consequently improve value creation 
(Banerjee and Eckard, 1998). More importantly, acquirer Tobin’s q2 which measures a firm’s 
value and can be interpreted as managerial performance (Lang et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991; 
Yermack, 1996) may interact with cultural distance to nullify or heighten the risk associated 
with cultural differences leading to value creation.  
This paper therefore extends prior literature by examining the effects of the interaction 
between cultural distance and salient acquirer characteristics, namely, acquirer size, prior 
experience of acquirer and acquirer Tobin’s q on value creation of acquiring firms from 
emerging market context. We attempt to achieve the above objective by employing the event 
study methodology which represents the future expectations of the investors about the 
performance (Chatterjee et al., 1992). In addition, we explore the impact of culture on long-
term returns of the acquirers using buy-and-hold abnormal returns. 
2 Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989: 138) point out that “Tobin q is an increasing function of the quality of a firm’s 
current and anticipated projects under existing management” 
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The choice of Chinese firms in emerging economy context is ideal to test our hypothesis 
for the following reasons. As the largest emerging market economy, Chinese firms have been 
involved in numerous international acquisitions more than any of the top emerging countries 
such as Russia, India and Brazil over the last decade (UNCTAD, 2015; Du et al., 2016). 
Moreover, as a former communist country, it is argued that China appears to have greater 
cultural differences compared to advanced market economies in Europe, Asia and North 
America (Shimizu et al., 2004; Boateng et al., 2016). The above considerations make China an 
ideal setting to explore the effects of cultural distance and firm-specific factors on CBM&A 
performance. 
The paper makes two primary contributions to the literature. The paper extends the 
previous literature on the effects of cultural distance on value creation by drawing attention to 
an important, yet mostly overlooked variables which may moderate the culture-value creation 
nexus of CBM&A by emerging market firms. Our results demonstrate that the effects of 
cultural distance on value creation are predicated on the size, prior experience and managerial 
performance of the acquiring firm. In In terms of economic magnitude, acquirer size, prior 
experience and high Tobin’s q help reduce the negative impact of cultural distance by an 
average of 592.6 million Chinese Yuan representing a 6.79 percentage point increase in 
firm value. Thus our results imply that acquirers with small firm size, little or no prior 
experience and low Tobin’s q are more likely to encounter cultural difficulties and liability of 
foreignness in the international market for corporate control. Second, this study attempts to 
reconcile the conflicting arguments regarding the effects of culture on value creation of firms 
from emerging market context. We show that analysing either the effects of cultural distance 
or firm-specific determinants separately may not provide a full understanding of value creation 
in CBM&A. Thus the examination of combined effects of cultural distance and acquirer 
characteristics yield better understanding and reconcile the conflicting literature streams on 
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culture and value creation of the acquirer firms. This paper therefore provides a useful first step 
in integrating the disparate literature on informal institutions and acquirer characteristics to 
shed new light on how acquirer firm resources, managerial capability and culture operate in 
tandem to improve value creation. Our results add to the theoretical model which suggests that 
firm resources interact with the social environment to influence performance. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the relevant 
literature and develops the hypotheses of the study. This is followed by an outline of data source 
and methodology. Section 4 presents the results and discusses the findings of the study. The 
final section provides a summary of the conclusion and discusses the implications of the study. 
2. Literature and Hypothesis development
2.1 Cultural distance, firm resources and value creation 
Prior studies indicate that acquisitions generally fail financially or destroy value of 
acquiring firms (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987; Tetenbaum, 1999; Erez-Rein et al., 2004). Yet 
firms continue to have a huge appetite for international expansion through acquisitions (Du et 
al., 2016; Boateng et al., 2017). Despite the growing number of studies in emerging country 
context (Gubbi et al., 2010; Ahern et al., 2015; Li et al., 2016), factors influencing the success 
or failure of acquisitions remain poorly understood (Du et al., 2016). Research evidence 
indicates that international expansion through acquisitions engender significant challenges 
which may diminish the value of the firms from emerging market economies. This is because 
the institutions in emerging countries are different and underdeveloped and have palpable 
consequences on firms’ internationalisation process (Du & Boateng, 2015; Rui & Yip, 2008). 
One notable informal institutional challenge is the risk resulting from cultural distance and 
business practices between the acquiring firm and target firm. National cultural distance, which 
represents differences in the norms, routines and repertoires for organisational design that are 
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found in the countries of origin of acquirer and the target firms, have widely recognised to be 
important for the success of CBM&A (Datta & Puia, 1995; Kogut and Singh, 1988; Morosini 
et al., 1998). Simmons & Nelson (2001) noted that national cultures influence organisational 
characteristics, practices and performance. It is therefore unsurprising that a large number of 
studies have investigated the effects of culture on firm performance over the past three decades. 
Despite the extensive research in respect of cultural distance-performance relationship, 
the results thus far remain mixed and we still do not fully understand the effects of culture on 
CBM&A. Prior literature offers two contradictory arguments: a positive view and a negative 
view. The positive view contends that greater cultural distance could increase the likelihood of 
acquisition success. For example, Page (2007); Morosini et al. (1998) suggest that cultural 
distance provides firms with benefits of exposure and access to diverse routines and repertoires 
embedded in unique cultures that were previously unavailable to acquiring firms. Cultural 
diversity facilitates innovation, provides learning opportunities and promotes new approaches 
to problem solving thereby increasing the likelihood of successful acquisition performance. 
Morosini et al. (1998) found a positive and significant impact of cultural distance on 
performance.  
On the other hand, the negative view emphasizes “acquisition cultural risk” (David and 
Singh, 1994: 251) and that cultural distance poses integration challenges and impedes 
acquisition success. It is argued that greater national cultural distance between the acquiring 
and target firms leads to poor acquisition performance. This is because synergy gains in 
acquisitions require post-acquisition coordination between the employees of acquirer and target 
firms (Ahern et al., 2015). Cultural differences therefore lead to misunderstanding, mistrust 
and make post-acquisition coordination and integration more costly and difficult rendering the 
realisation of synergies less likely. Prominent among researchers who found a negative relation 
between cultural distance and acquisition performance include Chatterjee et al. (1992); Datta 
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& Puia (1995); Li et al. (2016). For example, Datta & Puia (1995) and Reus & Lamont (2009) 
found direct and indirect negative effect of cultural distance on acquisition performance 
respectively. In fact, studies such as Markides & Ittner (1994); Barkema et al. (1996) found no 
evidence of positive and negative effect of cultural differences on performance indicating that 
the results thus far appear mixed and inconclusive. To summarise, studies examining the effects 
of cultural differences on performance have produced mixed and inclusive results. In this study, 
we argue that these mixed findings may be, partly, caused by the fact that prior studies on 
CBM&A value creation tend to focus exclusively on culture and ignore the moderating effects 
of firm specific resources and capabilities. This study departs from the commonly analysed 
variables and examines the joint effects of culture and firm-specific characteristics on value 
creation of acquiring firms.  
The examination of the combined effect of culture and firm-specific characteristics is 
significant in that resource-based view stresses the importance of internal aspects of a firm 
(Barney, 1991). It is argued that resources, particularly, intangible ones (e.g. experience and 
managerial skills) are more likely to produce a competitive advantage for a firm because they 
are often rare and socially complex, thereby making them difficult to imitate (Barney, 1991; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996). Indeed, studies in emerging country context such as Deng 
(2009) and Rui & Yip (2008) have reported that firms’ resources and capabilities are important 
to offset the competitive weaknesses of emerging market firms and increase firm value. The 
above arguments suggest that firm resources may help firms to overcome challenges of entering 
overseas market. Reus & Lamont (2009) and Dikova & Sahib (2013) echo similar views and 
point out that acquirer’s resources and capabilities play a moderating role regarding the 
outcomes of CBM&A. Thus, from this standpoint, resource-based view provides relevant basis 
for the study of CBM&A as this theory emphasises value maximisation through the use of firm 
resources (Das & Teng, 1991). 
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2.2 Hypotheses: The moderating effect of acquiring firm characteristics 
Prior literature have reported that cultural values impact on financial outcomes in the 
markets worldwide (Guiso et al., 2008; Chui et al., 2010). For example, Ahern et al. (2015) 
contend that cultural differences are particularly important in CBM&A because such 
transactions involve people with conflicting values working with each other to integrate and 
improve firm value. A number of researchers point out that synergy gains in CBM&A require 
co-ordination and communication between employees of the acquiring and target firms. Poor 
co-ordination serves to impede learning, knowledge transfer thereby leading to higher cost of 
information acquisition with deleterious effect on acquisition outcomes (Chatterjee et al., 1992; 
Datta and Puia, 1995; Li et al., 2016; Ahern et al., 2015). However, it may be argued that 
cultural differences may be influenced by firm characteristics (Hayward, 2002). Researchers 
such as Caves (1971); and Rugman & Verbeke (1992) argue that firm-specific characteristics 
constitute an important resource and provide stimulus for firm success in foreign markets. This 
argument is consistent with the resource-based view which emphasises value maximisation 
through pooling and utilising valuable resources via M&As. For example, it is argue that bigger 
firms tend to have more resources such as financial, marketing and personal resources and 
better absorptive capability to overcome challenges and costs associated with large cultural 
distance which may impede the realisation of potential synergies and value creation (Reus and 
Lamont, 2009; and Li et al., 2016). Other studies including Bernard & Jensen (2004); Li et al. 
(2016) and King et al. (2004) point out that bigger size leads to the economies of scale and 
scope in the integration process of CBM&A, and thus results in value creation for acquiring 
firms. Thus we hypothesize that: 
H1: Large acquirer size moderates the link between cultural distance and value creation of 
acquiring firms. 
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In CBM&A, Stahl & Voigt (2005), Reus & Lamont (2009) and Li et al. (2016) note 
that, acquiring firms are expected to absorb the resources and capabilities of targets which are 
embedded in different national cultures from their own. Haspeslagh & Jemison (1991), 
Hofstede et al. (2010), and Li et al. (2016) therefore point out that acquiring firms face complex 
national cultural challenges and problems, especially, when it is done in the international 
context. Buono et al. (1985) conducted a study on the impact of culture on M&As transactions 
and found that large culture distance tends to lead to uncomfortable feelings and hostility in 
CBM&A. Majidi (2007) shares this point of view, further suggesting that the increasing trends 
of CBM&A between developed and developing economies which tend to have larger national 
cultural differences may lead to less communication and mistrust.   
Scholars argue that one way to alleviate the effect of large cultural distance is through 
prior experience of the acquirer. It is thus argued that acquirer prior experience may yield rich 
inferences about causes of acquisition performance (McGrath, 2001; Hayward, 2002) hence it 
may facilitate improvement in subsequent acquisition performance. In other words, experience 
allows firms to become efficient and helps acquiring firms to improve its ability to integrate 
the resources of the combined firm. However, inexperience firms may not understand the 
complexities of acquisition (Nadolska & Barkema, 2007). Johanson & Vahlne (1977) echo 
similar view and suggest that firms develop skills at controlling international operations 
through experience. For example, Hayward (2002) and Hitt et al. (2001) note that prior 
international acquisition experience of acquiring firm may facilitate both the identification and 
integration of acquiring firms’ resources and capabilities which lead to value creation. With a 
higher level of prior experience, acquiring firms are likely to be less susceptible to cultural 
shocks and hence increase in firm value (Du & Boateng, 2015). Thus we hypothesize that 
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H2: Level of acquirer prior experience positively moderates the link between cultural distance 
and value creation. 
Resource based view suggests that firm resources are of various types which include 
human capital (Barney, 1991). The studies of Hambrick & Mason (1984); and Finkelstein & 
Hambrick (1996) emphasize the importance of human capital in firm performance and argue 
that organisations are reflections of their top managers. Tihanyi et al. (2000) echo similar views 
and indicate that, managers represent a unique organisational resource and constitute an 
important ingredient for a firm’s performance and competitive advantage. Tobin’s q represents 
an increasing function of the quality of a firm’s current and anticipated project under existing 
management (Lang et al., 1989) hence the q constitutes managerial resource and capability. It 
is therefore argued that if management performance is a major determinant of a firm’s q ratio, 
then the total gains from M&A are associated with the performance of the bidder management. 
Lang et al. (1991) and Servaes (1991) found high q bidders to have higher announcement 
abnormal returns for acquiring firms while acquirers with low q ratios have significant negative 
returns. We expect a higher Tobin q of the acquiring firm to reduce the deleterious impact of 
cultural risk on firm value. Thus we put forward the following hypothesis: 
H3: A higher Tobin’s Q positively moderates the link between cultural distance and value 
creation. 
3. Data and Methodology
3.1 Data Source 
        Our data is derived from several sources. The data of CBM&A is collected from Chinese 
Stock Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR) for the 1998-2012 period. CSMAR is a 
premier Chinese database jointly produced by the University of Hong-Kong and GTA with 
CBM&A data starting from 1998. In addition to the identities of parties involved, CSMAR 
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database provides details on firm characteristics and the relevant transaction dates 
(announcement and completion). We derive culture data from the National Culture Dimensions 
provided by Hofstede. The National Culture Dimensions (Hofstede, 2010) is one of the most 
frequently used measures of culture and was initially based on surveys of employees working 
for IBM between 1967 and 1973 and has been refined and used in cultural studies since then 
(Davis & Ruhe, 2003).  
3.2 Sample Selection 
The sample for our analysis begins with Chinese listed firms which carried out and completed 
CBM&A transactions from January 1998 to December 2012. Our initial sample consists of 397 
CBM&A bids by Chinese firms. For inclusion in the final sample, the following restrictions 
were imposed on the acquiring firms:   i) The acquirer must be listed in Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges under A share which provides data on CBM&As in China and the company 
shares must be actively traded; ii) Neither the acquirer nor the target should be a financial firm. 
Consequently, all the financial firms are excluded from the sample due to the different nature 
of assets and liabilities, financial reporting system and unique regulations which may influence 
the performance and thus lead to biased result; iii) The acquirer must not be involved in 
multiple acquisitions within three months to separate effects of each acquisition properly; iv) 
There should not be a contaminating announcement within ten business days before or after 
the announcement. The reason is that other events around acquisition may also influence the 
stock price which may lead to biased result of acquisition performance; v) The acquirer must 
acquire between 10-100 percent of the target in line with the definition of the US Department 
of Commerce which indicates that acquiring a stake of less than 10% is classified as a portfolio 
investment and such investors do not participate in the management of the firm; vi) The share 
price data and accounting information of acquirer must be available on CSMAR database. The 
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imposition of these restrictions led to the final sample of 209 cross-border acquisitions by 
Chinese bidders.  
3.3 Estimation period and Acquirer Returns 
The first issue examined in this paper is whether acquiring firms earn abnormal returns 
on the announcement of M&A. The study therefore uses the risk and market adjusted variant 
of event study methodology called market model. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
measures the market reaction to M&A announcement. A firm’s CAR is defined as the sum of 
its abnormal returns over a 5-day event window (t -2, t +2)3. The event date is the first 
announcement date of the takeover by successful bidder. Abnormal returns are defined as the 
firm’s actual stock returns less the return that a market model predicts4. The estimation period 
used in our empirical analysis is (t-240, t-21); that is, 240 trading days before the takeover 
announcement date, until 21 trading days prior to the takeover announcement date, where (t = 
0) is the takeover announcement date. In order to address thin and non-synchronous trading
concerns and further test the robustness of our results, we also calculate abnormal returns using 
the market adjusted returns model.  The results appear similar to those reported.  
Table 1 presents the results of CARs using three relatively short event windows (-1, 1; 
-2, 2) and two relatively long event windows (-5, 5; -10, 10). For all 4 event windows, the
results show that the announcement of CBM&A by Chinese firms creates value for Chinese 
acquirers. Positive returns for all 4 event windows range from 0.45% – 1.49% with all the 
returns significant at 1% level indicating that Chinese CBM&A general economic benefits. The 
results appear consistent with those reported by Boateng et al. (2008); Du and Boateng (2015) 
in the context of China and that of Gubbi et al. (2010) in India. The results that Chinese 
3 The results are robust to alternative short-event windows of (-1, +1); (-2, +2); (-10, +10) 
4 Market return is proxied by the “Shanghai composite return” 
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acquiring firms create value may be explained by the potential benefits of internationalisation 
such as diversification; access to overseas markets and strategic resources which Chinese firms 
lack. Another plausible explanation may be the Chinese government “go abroad” strategy that 
encourages and provides incentives such as cheaper source of finance to firms expanding to 
overseas countries. According to Du & Boateng (2015), such support tends to generate positive 
reaction from investors and the market regarding the future prospects of the firms and their 
values. 
        [Insert Table 1 Here] 
3.4. The Model 
The main aim of this paper is to investigate the combined effects of cultural distance 
and selected acquiring firm characteristics on value creation. Our multiple regression model is 
given as follows: 
     (1) 
Where CAR (-2, 2) is cumulative abnormal returns for 5-day event window,  FirmCh refers to 
selected acquiring firm variables, namely, acquirer size, acquirer prior experience and acquirer 
Tobin q; CulDis refers to cultural distance; Interactions refer to the interaction variables 
between cultural distance and acquirer characteristics, namely, CulDis*acquirer size; 








3.5 Variables Measurement 
Dependent Variable (CARs) 
We employ the stock market reaction to the announcement as reflected in the firm’s 
share price movement around the announcement of the CBM&A event. We chose this measure 
of performance for the following reasons: i) it is widely accepted in finance literature that the 
goal of a firm is to maximise the wealth of its shareholders, which is measured by the stock 
price. As a result, prior studies in finance and strategic management have extensively used 
market reaction in M&A studies (see Delong, 2001; McGee et al., 2008; Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2003). Importantly, prior studies involving cultural dimensions such as Datta and Puia 
(1995); Aybar and Ficci (2009); Du & Boateng (2015) have also employed bidder firm’s stock 
market returns thereby making our results comparable.  ii) Capital market theory indicates that 
share prices after acquisition announcement incorporate both financial and strategic 
information including the effects of cultural differences when estimating future consolidation 
cost and financial impact on acquisitions (Fama, 1970; Chatterjee et al., 1992). Consequently, 
share prices which reflect investors’ expectations of future firm earnings should respond 
appropriately to acquisition announcements and; iii) According to Cording et al. (2008) share 
price movement is relatively unbiased compared to other measures and invariant to differences 
in accounting policies across nations.  
This measure of performance is therefore preferred to longer term performance as this 
measure is more likely to measure the effect of the focal acquisition rather than being 
confounded by other subsequent acquisitions that were completed later. More importantly, 
Haleblian et al. (2006)  Kale et al. (2002) note that share price movement has a better predictive 
value than other objective measures, such as profitability, because it is an ex-ante firm value 
measure that has been found to correlate with ex-post firm value. We measure the M&A firm 
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value of Chinese acquirers using the standardised cumulative abnormal returns (SCARs) for 
event window (-2, 2). 
3.6 Independent Variables 
Following previous studies (e.g. Slangen and van Tulder, 2009; Du and Boateng, 2015), we 
measured cultural distance by utilising the difference in country scores of each of Hofstede 
(1980) four dimensions of national culture, namely, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, 
individualism, and masculinity. We measured each target country through a Euclidean version 
of the Kogut and Singh (1988) index. Unlike the Kogut and Singh index, which assumes that 
all of the cultural dimensions are equally important, the Euclidean version relaxes this 





















Where jCD is the cultural distance between country j and China, ijI is country j’s score on the 
ith cultural dimension, iCI is the score of China on this dimension, and iV is the variance of the 
score of the dimension. Acquirer firm size is measure as a log of total assets (Chinese Yuan) 
for the financial year ending immediately before the year of acquisition announcement. Prior 
experience of a Chinese acquirer is measured as the number of prior foreign acquisitions made 
at the time of purchase. Acquirer Tobin’s Q is defined as a market value of equity plus book 
value of debt over the sum of book value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid, 
measures a bidder’s managerial performance (Servaes, 1991).  
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3.7 Control Variables 
Following the M&A literature, several control measures are included in the regression 
model. Return on Asset (ROA): It is argued that highly profitable firms are more likely to invest 
abroad, as they possess better financial resources.  ROA is measured as a ratio of net income 
after taxes to the average total assets at book value. Deal size: Acquiring large target gives the 
acquiring firm’s managers greater power, more reputation, higher salary and social recognition 
not to mention economies of scale and scope (Firth, 1980). Therefore, large deal size may be a 
source of empire building. Deal size is measured as a log of the amount paid for the target in 
Chinese Yuan. Relative size of acquirer and target constitutes an important determinant of the 
extent of takeover gains and how they are shared between the acquirer and target (Travlos, 
1987). Acquisition relatedness may create market power for the acquiring firm by increasing 
the absolute size and breadth of the firm (Singh and Montgomery, 1987) and enhance a firm 
value through economies of scale. We measure firm relatedness by a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if acquirer and target are in similar business and zero if otherwise. We also 
control geographical origin as prior studies suggest that regional domicile has impact on value 
creation (Aybar & Ficci, 2009). Large cash holding raises agency problems in that managers 
may invest unproductively (Jensen, 1986). We expect cash holding of acquirer to affect the 
acquirer returns. Cash holding is measured as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total 
assets. Acquisitions in different regions may also explain the differences in wealth effects 
because of the diversification potential between regions (Kiymaz, 2004). A dummy variable 
taking a value of one, if acquisition takes place in Asia, zero, if otherwise. A high level of 
leverage may impose a budget constraint on the acquirer’s ability to raise sufficient debt to 
finance the acquisition. Conversely, a low debt ratio may improve the likelihood of raising 
sufficient debt to pay for the acquisition. We measure the leverage ratio as total debt divided 
by the total book value of assets. Transaction cost literature suggests that using a common 
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language is likely to lower cost as one language is used for intercompany communications 
(Hisey and Caves, 1985). A dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the acquirer and the 
target use Mandarin as their language, and zero, if otherwise. Consistent to previous studies, 
we also control state ownership, cash payment and price earnings ratio. Risky firms tend to 
have a high default risk and are therefore vulnerable to external shocks, therefore we control 
acquirer beta. The summary of how the independent variables are measured is provided in 
appendix 1. 
4. Results
4.1 Summary statistics 
Table 2 summarises the descriptive statistics relating to our both independent and dependent 
variables. The mean of the cultural distance between home and host countries is 2.122, 
suggesting that the target countries differ in terms of the culture from China. The acquirer size 
has a mean of 15.39 suggesting that Chinese firms involved in CBM&A activities are large in 
terms of size. Regarding the Tobin’s Q, the mean score across the 543 observations is 1.747 
whilst the 75th percentile is 1.960 
   [Insert Table 2 Here] 
The correlation matrix summarised in Table 3 shows that correlations between the independent 
variables are low and exhibit no serious multicollinearity issues. A further test using VIF 
procedure confirms that multicollinearity appears not to be a problem in this study as the 
average variance inflation factor for each variable is less than 10. Standard errors were adjusted 
for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and year. 
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[Insert Table 3 Here] 
4.2 Baseline Regression Results 
Before testing our main hypotheses (H1 – H3), we conducted a baseline tests on the link 
between the cultural distance, selected acquirer characteristics, and the control variables and 
value creation of acquiring firms. Our baseline results reported in Table 4 indicate that cultural 
distance has a negative and significant influence on acquirer returns suggesting that national 
cultural distance reduces firm value of foreign acquiring firms. The findings appear to support 
those studies which view large cultural distance as a source of risk which negatively affect firm 
value (Datta & Puia 1995; Ahern et al., 2015; Li et al., 2016). In terms of the selected acquirer 
characteristics, we find acquirer size to exert a negative and significant influence on the value 
creation of the acquirer firms. The results confirm the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) and 
Alexandridis et al. (2011) who found acquirer size to be negatively related to acquisition 
performance. However, we find the acquirer’s prior experience and Tobin q to be positive but 
statistically insignificant. In considering the control variables, we find leverage to have a 
negative and significant influence on firm value while deal size has a positive and significant 
influence on value creation. 
       (Insert Table 4 Here) 
4.3 Cultural distance and value creation: The moderating role of Acquirer characteristics 
Table 5 reports the effects of cultural distance and the interaction between cultural distance and 
the acquiring firm characteristics. Consistent with the results in Table 4, Models 1-3 in Table 
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5 confirm that cultural distance has a negative and significant effect on the value creation of 
acquirers. Following the usual practice of moderated regression (see Peng and Jiang, 2010), we 
next introduce interactions between cultural distance and selected acquirer characteristics 
successively, (i.e., CulDis*size; CulDis*experience; and CulDis*Tobin’s q), into our 
regression analysis. After the inclusion of the interactions, the negative and significant effect 
of cultural distance becomes positive and significant 5  in Models 1-3 suggesting that the 
interaction reverses the negative effect of cultural distance on value creation. This means the 
selected firm characteristics exert stronger effect than culture on value creation. Specifically, 
we find coefficients for the three interactive variables (i.e., CulDis*size (β = 0.059; p<0.05) 
CulDis*Experience (β= 0.071; p<0.05); and CulDis*Tobin’s q (β= 0.3799; p<0.05) to be 
positive and significant. Thus, the results suggest that acquirer size, prior experience, and the 
acquirer’s Tobin q interact with cultural distance to create value for the acquiring firms, and 
therefore, Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3 are supported. The results that large firm positively moderates 
the link between cultural distance and value creation may be explained by the fact that, large 
firms have more resources to overcome the problems associated with cultural distance. 
Regarding the interaction between cultural distance and prior experience, Model 2 of Table 4 
shows that prior experience positively moderates the relationship between cultural distance and 
value creation. This finding suggests that more experienced acquirers are more skilful at 
resolving cultural challenges associated with acquisitions thereby increasing firm value. The 
results render some support to the findings of Dikova and Sahib (2013). We also document that 
acquirer Tobin’s q positively moderates the cultural distance and CBM&A value creation 
suggesting that well-managed acquirers tend to overcome cultural challenges associated with 
5 Given that the coefficients of the three interaction terms in Table 5 are all positive, we calculated that the 
net/marginal effects of CulDis*size; CulDis*experience; and CulDis*Tobin’s q. For CulDis*size, we compute 
the net effect as follows: (0.059 x 15.394) + (-0.066) =0.842246 (net effect); 0.059 is conditional effect from 
interaction between size and cultural distance; -0.066 is unconditional negative effect of cultural distance; and 
15.394 is the mean value. The computation of net effects and thresholds are consistent with prior literature 
(Brambor et al., 2005; Boateng et al., 2018). 
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CBM&A. Taken together, the results indicate that acquirer size; prior experience and Tobin q 
(i.e., proxies for acquirer resources and managerial performance and competence respectively) 
positively moderate the effect of cultural distance on value creation of CBM&A. Thus our 
results indicate the moderating effects of selected acquirer characteristics appear to exert a 
stronger influence than the impact of cultural distance on value creation. In terms of economic 
magnitude, acquirer size, prior experience and high Tobin’s q help to reduce the negative 
impact of cultural distance by an average of 592.6 million Chinese Yuan representing a 
6.79 percentage point increase in firm value. 
    [Insert Table 5 Here] 
Robustness Check 
To check the robustness of our regression models, we employ several additional specifications 
to rule out alternative explanations. First, we used sales and number of employees as proxies 
for acquirer size and the results reported in Table 6 remain unchanged. Second, we replaced 
CAR (-2, 2) with CAR (-5, 5), the results reported in Table 7 are remain similar to results 
documented in Table 5 
      [Insert Tables 6 & 7 here] 
Alternative Estimation: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) 
In order to find out whether cultural differences may influence the long term performance of 
the acquiring firms, we also employed buy-and-hold abnormal return. BHAR assumes that 
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investors buy firms’ shares and hold over a period of time, for example, 12 or 36 months. As 
Barber and Lyon (1997) pointed out, the advantage of the BHAR is to take into account the 
experience of the investor through the compounding of returns which makes the method more 
suitable to examine long-term financial performance. We calculate BHAR as follows: 
The return of event firm: 
  11  itRR (1) 




















Where s is the beginning period, t is the period of investment (in months), itR is the return on 
security i in month t , and sn is the number of securities traded in month𝑠, the beginning period 
for the return calculation.  
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return: 
RERRBHAR  (3) 
Where 𝑅 is prior event 12-36 months and post-event 12-60 months buy and hold returns for 
sample firms, and 𝑅𝑅𝐸 is prior event 12-36 months and post-event 12-60 months buy and hold 
returns of benchmark portfolios. 
Through the above equation, we measure the 12 months BHAR as the difference between the 
BHAR of the acquirer and BHAR of the appropriate size and book-to- market value. The post 
event BHAR and the effects of culture on long-term performance of the acquiring firms are 
reported in Appendix 2. As the Table shows the long-term returns for 12 – 60 months have 
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negative signs suggesting that acquirers do generate negative and insignificant returns in the 
long-term.  
Regarding the impact of culture on long-term returns, Table 8 documents that cultural distance 
exert a negative but insignificant effect on the returns of acquirers. One plausible explanation 
may be that, in the long-term, cultural challenges may be overcome as the company employs 
people in the host country. This is because these employees may be familiar with the country’s 
culture or may learn more about the country’s culture and adjust appropriately in the long-term. 
Similarly, if the company employs nationals of the target country, culture challenges may less 
severe. Moreover, we believe that culture adds costs or affect performance at the integrating 
stage. 
[Insert Table 8 Here] 
5. Conclusion and Implications
The role of national cultural distance in explaining CBM&A has been examined by a number 
of researchers (Stahl and Voigt, 2008; Reus and Lamont, 2009; Chakrabarti et al., 2009; Dikova 
and Sahib, 2013; Ahern et al., 2015). However, despite attempts to find a coherent explanation 
for culture - acquisition performance relationship, the results have been mixed and inconclusive. 
Thus, the mixed results suggest that the commonly analysed variables have failed to provide 
full understanding CBM&A value creation. In this study, we contend that acquirer resources 
and integrating capabilities and their interaction with cultural variables may provide a better 
understanding of acquisition performance. Therefore, we examine the association between 
cultural distance and value creation, and further explore whether salient acquirer characteristics 
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moderate the cultural distance-value creation nexus of acquiring firms from emerging market 
context.  
Using a sample of 209 acquisition announcements during the 1998-2012 period, the following 
findings are documented. First, this study finds that CBM&A from emerging countries create 
value for the acquiring firms. The results indicate that, on average, the Chinese acquirers 
engaged in CBM&A enjoy significant gains ranging from 0.45% – 1.49% from the day of 
announcement to the next 10 days. The findings are in line with previous studies such as 
Boateng et al. (2008); Du & Boateng (2015) in the context of China and Gubbi et al. (2010) in 
India. Regarding the factors influencing the value creation, we document that cultural 
differences between the acquirer firm and the target firm negatively impact on value creation 
of the acquirer in both the short-and-long-term. However, the negative impact appears not to 
be significant on the long-term value.  An important conclusion to be drawn here is that cultural 
distance is important in the short-term; however, over a longer period of time, this factor 
appears irrelevant, at least for stock returns6. Regarding the effect of interaction between 
cultural distance and acquirer characteristics, we find the interactions to have positive and 
significant effect on value creation in the short-term.  
Our study has several implications for managers and policy makers. First, the results of 
this study show cultural differences between the acquiring firm and the target firm reduces 
shareholder value. However, the extent of the negative effect of culture distance is conditioned 
by the acquirer characteristics such as size, prior experience and Tobin’s q. This implies 
acquirer resources and managerial capabilities are important in dealing and overcoming 
CBM&A cultural challenges which negatively affect performance of culturally different 
CBM&A. More specifically, the results imply that large acquirers and acquirers with high level 
6 We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. 
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of experience are more likely to have both tangible and intangible resources to overcome 
cultural problems and create value for acquirers. Another important implication from the results 
of this study is that, managerial performance and capability is a key to overcoming cultural 
challenges in CBM&A. Lastly, our results indicate that culture has effect on value creation. 
Policy makers should therefore not focus only on corporate governance reforms but should also 
engage civil society, and businesses to take an active part in bringing about changes in culture 
that affect value creation of firms in their respective countries.   
Despite the interesting findings of this study, it is pertinent to point out that our study 
is not without limitations. Our study is based on short-term performance (event study) which 
is based on the assumption of semi-strong form of efficiency of stock markets. It may be 
possible that the value implications of such a complex strategic investment may not be fully 
understood by the stock market participants and the results may thus be prone to heuristic 
biases. Second, Tobin q has been employed extensively to measure managerial and board level 
ability and performance (see Lang et al., 1989; Yermack, 1996), however, due to lack of data 
in Chinese context we could not use other measures of managerial ability. Despite these 
limitations, we believe our results demonstrate the importance of culture in CBM&A by 
providing an alternative and valuable view on moderators of the relationship between cultural 
distance and CBM&A performance. Future studies should examine culture-acquisition 
performance and the moderating role of acquirer characteristics in a cross-country study 
employing other measures of managerial ability to further enhance our understanding on 
culture-performance nexus. 
Acknowledgement: We would like to thank Professor Brian Lucey (Editor) and the two 
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    Table 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for CBM&A Acquirers 
Event Window CAR (%) Z-statistics P-value
CAR (-10,10) 1.486 6.478 0.000 
CAR (-5,5) 1.180 5.550 0.000 
CAR (-2,2) 0.741 6.213 0.000 
CAR (-1,1) 0.445 5.128 0.000 
This table presents the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of Chinese cross-border M&A over 
1998-2012 sample periods. CARs are measured using daily excess returns during various event 
windows. 
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      Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables      Mean SD P25     P50     P75 
CulDis 2.122 1.442 0.788 1.348 3.709 
Acquirer Size 15.394 1.137 14.608 15.28 16.019 
Leverage 0.477 0.230 0.310 0.473 0.637 
Tobin Q 1.747 1.010 1.159 1.446 1.960 
Relative Size 0.099 0.166 0.018 0.038 0.104 
Deal Size (million) 627 1660 40 107 349 
Cash holding %  17.927 13.836 7.910 14.120 23.470 
Acquirer ROA 0.059 0.067 0.030 0.059 0.087 
Acquirer PE 58.247 105.515 16.309 32.05 60.439 
Acquirer Beta 0.125 0.339 -0.072 0.042 0.240 
SOE Dummy 0.225 0.418 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Experience 0.357 0.48 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Relatedness 0.439 0.497 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Asia Dummy 0.597 0.491 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Language Dummy 0.559 0.497 0.000 1.000 1.000 
CashPay 0.896 0.305 1.000 1.000 1.000 
This table reports the mean, standard deviations, 25th percentile, median, 75th percentile of acquirer 
and deal characteristics. See Appendix for the detailed definition of variables. 
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Table 3: Correlation Matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
CulDis 1.000 
Acquirer Size 0.081 1.000 
Leverage 0.094 0.149* 1.000 
Tobin Q -0.113 0.083 -0.090 1.000 
Relative Size 0.039 0.199** -0.248*** 0.112 1.000 
Deal Size (million) -0.007 0.232*** -0.104 0.181** 0.250*** 1.000 
Cash holding %  0.004 -0.081 -0.076 0.065 -0.073 -0.035 1.000 
Acquirer ROA -0.115 -0.008 -0.103 -0.006 -0.088 0.032 0.051 1.000 
Acquirer PE 0.048 -0.108 0.113 0.026 0.048 -0.086 0.090 -0.022
Acquirer Beta -0.028 0.172* -0.050 -0.032 0.032 -0.004 -0.183** -0.015
SOE Dummy -0.064 0.096 0.053 0.098 0.029 0.048 0.052 -0.145*
Experience 0.055 0.530*** 0.329*** -0.047 -0.062 0.059 -0.066 -0.067
Relatedness 0.012 0.195** -0.029 0.102 0.105 0.092 0.010 -0.152*
Asia Dummy -0.012 -0.227*** 0.099 0.003 -0.099 -0.127 0.116 0.013 
Language Dummy -0.083 -0.191** 0.120 -0.036 -0.135 -0.089 0.118 0.047 
CashPay -0.011 -0.011 0.084 0.068 -0.044 0.019 -0.001 0.070 
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Acquirer PE 1.000 
Acquirer Beta -0.200** 1.000
SOE Dummy 0.003 -0.063 1.000 
Experience -0.060 0.112 0.402*** 1.000 
Relatedness 0.053 0.016 0.196** 0.228*** 1.000 
Asia Dummy 0.147* -0.265*** -0.136* -0.211** -0.147* 1.000 
Language Dummy 0.106 -0.234*** -0.065 -0.160* -0.194** 0.816*** 1.000
CashPay -0.019 0.134 -0.142* -0.030 -0.221** -0.028 -0.058 1.000 
This table reports the correlation matrix of key variables. Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% 
(*). See Appendix for the detailed definition of variables. 
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Table 4: Baseline Regression: Culture distance and CBM&A Value Creation 
CAR(-2, 2) CAR(-5, 5) 
CulDis -0.047*** -0.183***
(0.005) (0.005)




Tobin Q -0.002 -0.021
(0.493) (0.387)




Acquirer PE 0.000 -0.000
(0.317) (0.819)
Acquirer Beta -0.040* -0.045
(0.090) (0.615)




Relative Size 0.012 -0.023
(0.145) (0.508)




Asia Dummy 0.008 -0.113
(0.682) (0.157)
Language Dummy 0.003 -0.015
(0.846) (0.891)





adj. R-sq 0.187 0.090
Year Dummy Y Y
Ind Dummy Y Y
This table presents results of the effects of culture distance, acquirer and deal-specific characteristics 
on value creation of Chinese cross-border M&As. The dependent variable is acquirer CAR(-2,2) & 
CAR(-5,5). Variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects. The values reported in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered by firm and year.  Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 1% (*) respectively. 
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Table 5: Culture distance and value creation: Moderating role of acquirer characteristics 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 




CulDis*Experience (H2) 0.068** 
(0.017) 
CulDis*Tobin Q (H3) 0.327*** 
(0.006) 
Acquirer Size -0.050*** -0.021*** -0.025
(0.003) (0.009) (0.729)
Leverage -0.036 -0.050** -0.052
(0.107) (0.035) (0.753)
Tobin Q -0.006 -0.001 -0.329***
(0.343) (0.777) (0.000)
Cash holding 0.002 0.004 -0.019
(0.850) (0.724) (0.735)
ROA -0.175 -0.141 0.065
(0.205) (0.297) (0.934)
Acquirer PE 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.622) (0.302) (0.469)
Acquirer Beta -0.042* -0.043* -0.091
(0.095) (0.070) (0.293)
SOE (0/1) 0.009 0.009 0.181***
(0.433) (0.520) (0.009)
Experience -0.005 -0.027 0.069
(0.703) (0.342) (0.348)
Relative Size 0.015** 0.010 0.027
(0.040) (0.251) (0.568)
Deal Size 0.000 0.000* 0.000
(0.409) (0.098) (0.536)
Relatedness 0.003 0.008 -0.019
(0.878) (0.552) (0.759)
Asia Dummy 0.014 0.004 0.033
(0.521) (0.851) (0.840)
Language Dummy -0.001 0.010 0.125
(0.948) (0.542) (0.440)
CashPay (0/1) -0.025* -0.014 -0.023
(0.084) (0.436) (0.802)
Intercepts 0.119** 0.405*** 0.612
(0.025) (0.005) (0.543)
N 208 209 201
Adjusted R 0.184 0.193 0.043
Year Dummy Y Y Y
Industry Dummy Y Y Y
This table presents results of the effects of interactions between culture distance and selected firm-
specific variables on value creation of Chinese cross-border M&As. The dependent variable is acquirer 
CAR(-2,2). Variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects. The values reported in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered by firm and year.  Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 1% (*) respectively. 
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      Table 6: Robustness Check 
CAR(-2, 2) CAR(-2, 2) 
CulDis -0.045** -0.047**
(0.013) (0.010)






Tobin Q -0.001 -0.002
(0.806) (0.611)




Acquirer PE 0.000 0.000
(0.359) (0.364)
Acquirer Beta -0.049** -0.047*
(0.048) (0.057)




Relative Size 0.016* 0.016*
(0.081) (0.063)




Asia Dummy 0.008 0.020
(0.682) (0.324)
Language Dummy 0.003 -0.005
(0.846) (0.793)





adj. R-sq 0.187 0.163
Year Dummy Y Y
Ind Dummy Y Y
This table presents results of the effects of culture distance, acquirer and deal-specific characteristics 
on value creation of Chinese CBM&A employing sales and number of employees as proxies for size. 
The dependent variable is acquirer CAR(-2,2). All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects. The values reported in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered by firm and year.  Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 1% (*) respectively 
. 
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       Table 7: Robustness Check: Dependent Variable: (CAR -5, 5) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
CulDis -0.273** -0.063*** -0.203**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.083) 
CulDis*Size (H1) 0.260* 
(0.078) 
CulDis*Experience (H2) 0.066** 
(0.050) 
CulDis*Tobin Q (H3) 0.301*** 
(0.004) 
Control variables Y Y Y 
N 208 209 201 
Adjusted R 0.184 0.193 0.043 
Year Dummy Y Y Y 
Industry Dummy Y Y Y 
     This table presents results of the effects of interactions between culture distance and selected firm-
specific variables on value creation of Chinese cross-border M&As. The dependent variable is acquirer 
CAR(-5,5). Variables are defined in Appendix. All regressions control for year and industry fixed 
effects. The values reported in parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and 
clustered by firm and year.  Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 1% (*) respectively. 
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          Table 8: Effects of Cultural Distance on Long-term Returns 
BHAR 12M BHAR 24M 
CulDis -0.120 -0.046
(0.145) (0.457) 
Acquirer Size -0.050 -0.094
(0.360) (0.168) 
Leverage 0.365* 0.095 
(0.100) (0.715) 
Tobin Q -0.062*** -0.073**
(0.000) (0.023) 




Acquire PE -0.000** -0.001***
(0.038) (0.006) 
Acquirer Beta -0.110 -0.000
(0.274) (0.999) 
SOE -0.008 0.203 
(0.966) (0.309) 
Experience 0.196*** 0.190** 
(0.000) (0.013) 
Relative Size -0.076** -0.119***
(0.033) (0.000) 




Asia Dummy 0.116** 0.070 
(0.026) (0.276) 
Language Dummy -0.178*** -0.178*
(0.000) (0.057) 
CashPay (0/1) -0.053 -0.251
(0.285) (0.227) 
Intercepts 0.325 0.445 
(0.705) (0.627) 
N 178 178 
adj. R-sq 0.030 0.040 
Year Dummy Y Y 
Ind Dummy Y Y 
This table presents results of the effects of culture distance, acquirer and deal-specific characteristics 
on long-term returns of Chinese CBM&A. The dependent variable is acquirer BHAR (12 & 24 
months). All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects. The values reported in 
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parentheses are standard errors adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and year.  
Significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 1% (*) respectively. 




Percentage of equity ownership to total equity by the central 
government, local government, and governmental agencies and 
institutions held in a Chinese firm (Lin et al., 1997).   
Acquirer Beta Beta is compiled by regressing a firm’s monthly stock returns on the 
corresponding index returns. 
Leverage Ratio as total debt divided by the total book value of assets. 
Cultural Distance 
(CulDis) 
The difference in country scores of each of Hofstede (1980) 
four dimensions of national culture, namely, uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, individualism, and masculinity. 
We measured each target country through a Euclidean version 
of the Kogut and Singh (1988) index. 
Acquirer PE Price to Earning Ratio (price per share divided by earnings per 
share)  
Acquirer Size Log of acquirers’ total assets in Chinese Yuan. We also use log of 
sales and number of employees as additional measures for size. 
Tobin’s Q Market value of equity plus book value of debt over the sum of book 
value of equity plus book value of debt prior to the bid. 
ROA Ratio of net income after taxes to the average total assets at book 
value. 
Deal size (SIZE) Log of the amount paid for the target firm. 
Cash holding Ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets. 
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Relatedness A dummy variable taking a value 1 if acquirer and target are in 
related industry; 0 if otherwise. 
Experience Number of prior foreign acquisitions made at the time of purchase. 
Asia Dummy(Asia) Following the work of Kiymaz (2004), a dummy variable, taking a 
value of 1 if target is based in Asia and 0 if otherwise 
Language Dummy A dummy variable which takes a value of one, if the acquirer and the 
target use Mandarin as their language, and 0, if otherwise. 
    Appendix 2: Long-term Returns of Chinese CBM&A over 12-60 Months 
Variable        Mean       SD 
Bootstrap 
Skewness Z P-value
BHAR 12 Months -0.017 0.444 0.210     0.833 
BHAR 24 Months -0.052 0.641 -0.780     0.434 
BHAR 36 Months -0.061 0.826 -0.800     0.424 
BHAR 48 Months -0.066 1.223 -0.530     0.593 
BHAR 60 Months -0.084 1.170 -0.830     0.406 
This table reports BHAR results of Chinese CBM&A. BHAR is buy-and- hold abnormal 
returns based on the average difference in the aggregated (compounded) performance 
between the sample stock and the benchmark over  12-60 months 
